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Abstract
In this paper we revisit the mining strategies in proof of work based cryptocurrencies and propose two
strategies, we call smart and smarter mining, that in many cases strictly dominate honest mining. In contrast
to other known attacks, like selfish mining, which induce zero-sum games among the miners, the strategies
proposed in this paper increase miners’ profit by reducing their variable costs (i.e., electricity). Moreover, the
proposed strategies are viable for much smaller miners than previously known attacks, and surprisingly, an
attack performed by one miner is profitable for all other miners as well.
While saving electricity power is very encouraging for the environment, it is less so for the coin’s security.
The smart/smarter mining strategies expose the coin to under 50% attacks, and this vulnerability might only
grow when new miners join the coin as a response to the increase in profit margins induced by these strategies.
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1 Introduction
As of the end of 2018, the total cryptocurrency market cap is above 100 Billion dollars. Dozens of new coins
emerge every month and the industry of digital mining is blooming. According to [2], the vast majority of the
coins are based on the PoW technology [5], which received a lot of attention with the introduction of Bitcoin [15].
The main idea is that a lot of power has to be wasted in order to change the coin state, what makes Sybil attacks
impossible, and thus makes consensus possible in an anonymous open networks. The drawback of this technology
is the huge amount of electricity it consumes. As of 2018, the Bitcoin alone consumes more electricity than 159
countries including Nigeria and Morocco [1]. A part from not being environmental friendly, the huge waste of
power induces very high costs on coins maintenance.
The main entities in a cryptocurrency system are the miners. They maintain the state and preserve the security
by doing work that requires a lot of power, and in return they get to mint new coins. For economical and security
reasons, cryptocurrencies try to enforce a fixed rate of new minted coins1. This is done by determining how much
power has to be invested by a miner in order to mint one coin, which is usually called the difficulty. Ideally, if the
total mining power (by all miners) invested in a coin would have been known at any given time, then the difficulty
would have been accurately calculated and the fix minting rate could be enforced. However, this is not the case.
Miners can freely join and leave the system at any time, and free to stop mining if it is not profitable for them.
Therefore, the best cryptocurrency systems can do is to predict the future based on the estimation of the total
mining power from the past. This is done by dividing executions into epochs, where each epoch consists of a fix
number of minted coins. (For example, in Bitcoin [15], each epoch consists of 2016 block, each of which mints
12.5 coins - as of 2018.) The difficulty for each epoch is calculated based on the estimation of the total mining
power in the previous epoch. This means that coins can adjust to changes in the total mining power only during
epoch changes, which makes them vulnerable to sudden changes in total mining power. This vulnerability was
already noticed before as one that can lead to a problem called “blockchain death spiral” [3], in which miners
suddenly leave a coin (possibly because its value suddenly dropped), leaving it with high difficulty and forcing
a long epoch. This can lead to serious throughput decrease in strong coins, and to a total death of small ones. In
this paper we further explore this vulnerability and show how miners con exploit it for their benefit. In particular,
we show that the “desired equilibrium” in which miners always mine with their total power is not an equilibrium.
surprisingly, we show that in many cases stop mining and being idle is a strictly better strategy. The basic concept
is based on the fact that the total mining power in each epoch determines the difficulty, and thus also the revenue
of miners, in the next epoch. Therefore, if a miner does not mine during an epoch, it loses the revenue of this
epoch, but it saves the cost of the power in this epoch and gain more revenue in the next epoch due to the difficulty
adjustment.2 We call the strategy in which a miner alternately mine in an epoch and then idle in the following epoch
a smart mining strategy, where epochs in which the miner mines and epochs in which it does not mine are called
high revenue epochs (HRE) and low revenue epochs (LRE), respectively. See Figure 1 for illustration. Interestingly,
the benefit of the smart miner strategy does not come on account of other miners. On the contrary, other miners
befit from it even more since they lose nothing in low revenue epochs and gain in high revenue epochs. Having
this in mind, we show that in some cases miners benefit the most from mining with only part of their mining power.
We call this strategy smarter mining. The smarter mining strategy can be seen as an optimization of smart mining.
Note that while smart and smarter mining is a win-win for all miners and the environment, the coin security is
compromised during low revenue epochs. Not only that a smart miner does not mine in low revenue epochs, it might
be the case that other miners gain from joining him and thus leaving the coin exposed to attacks (during low revenue
epochs) by a badminer that controls less than 51%of the totalmining power. The smart and smartermining strategies
increase the profit margins in high revenue epochs, which might bring newminers to the coin and potentially correct
the coin security. However, surprisingly, we get exactly the opposite effect. When new miners join the high revenue
1Presently, for example, the Bitcoin systems [15] tries to enforce miners to collectively mint 75 new coins every hour.
2In practise there is a maximum factor by which the difficulty can change between two consecutive epochs. However, it does not
invalidate our attack, it only adds another parameter for our analysis, which for simplicity and readability we choose to omit in this paper.
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epochs, the difficulty in the low revenue epoch goes higher, and thus the revenue per time unit in the low revenue
epochs decreases, which might force miners to leave these epochs and expose the coin to even more attacks.
Analysing the strategic behavior of miners in cryptocurrency systems has become a subject to a large study in
the last few years [14, 10, 18, 16, 7, 13, 12, 9, 19, 11, 21, 22, 6]. The pioneering “Selfish-Mining” attack strategy
demonstrated that deviating from the mining protocol can be beneficial even without a majority of the mining
power [10]. Their strategy, however, requires 25% or more of the mining power, which is relatively high. Smart
mining, on the other hand, is relevant for smaller miners as well. For example, if the fixed costs represent 10%
of the miner’s total costs, having just 12% of the mining power suffices. Moreover, the long term effect of allowing
new players to join the system exposes significant differences. While in selfish mining the joining of new players
restores the system’s security, in smart mining the opposite happens. Players that join the coin for economical
reasons, unintentionally further damage the coin security and increase its vulnerability to under 51% attacks.
In [7], Carlsten et al. showed that selfish mining can be made profitable for a miner with a low hash power
share in a model in which miners are getting paid by transactions fees rather than by minted coins. In the same
model, Tsabary and Eyal [22], showed that miners can increase their profit by not mine (being idle), and thus
reduce their electricity costs, when the total fees amount of available transactions is low. In this paper we consider
the more standard model, that is currently used in practice, in which miners are paid in new minted coins, and to
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a dominating strategy that is beneficial to all miners (i.e.,
the attacker and honest miners), but decreases the coin security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we give an overview on PoW-based cryptocurrencies
and in section 3 we define our model. In Section 4 we introduce and analyse the smart and smarter mining strategies,
and in Section 5 we analyse the other miners best response and discuss the implication on the coin security. In
Section 6 we conclude the paper.
(a) Desired equilibrium: Never idle. (b) Smart mining: Idle every other epoch.
Figure 1: A miner’s profit in an epoch is the revenue minus the costs, which is the uncovered green area. In the
desired equilibrium, the profit is the same in every epoch. In smart mining, the miner pays the fixed cost and gains
no profit in LRE epochs, but gain large profit in HRE epochs. If the profit bonus in HRE epochs is bigger than
the fixed cost plus the epoch profit in the desired equilibrium strategy, then the smart mining strategy is more
profitable for the miner.
2 Proof of work overview
In the next sectionwe define amodel that aims to capture the core of the proof of work (PoW) based cryptocurrencies
(e.g., Bitcoin [15] and Ethereum [4]) mechanism that we need to demonstrate our attack. In this section we give
a short and simplified description of how it works. PoW, which was first introduced in Bitcoin [15], is a novel
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approach to solve randomized synchronous anonymous byzantine leader election. The idea is that there is a
known to all puzzle which all parties try to solve by performing hash operations, where the difficulty of the puzzle
determines the probability for a single hash operation to solve the puzzle. The first party that maneges to solve the
puzzle broadcasts the solution, and as a result it is elected as the leader. Parties are usually called miners, the number
of hash functions that a miner can perform in a time unit is called mining power. An important property of PoW,
which make it useful for cryptocurrencies, is the fact that the probability of a miner to be the first to solve the puzzle
and become the leader is equal to the ratio of the miner’s mining power out of the total mining power of all miners.
Most of the PoW-based cryptocurrency systems use PoW in the following (simplified) way. They start from
a known-to-all genesis block that determine the first puzzle. Once a solution to the kth puzzle is found, the chosen
leader (the party that found the solution) broadcasts it to all parties. The solution forms a block that is added to the
block-chain, which in turn determines the next puzzle. However, this basic idea has several challenges that needed
to be addressed:
• First, the system must give incentives for the miners in order to encourage them to participate in the protocol
(e.g., solve the puzzles). To this end, miners get paid, by new coins they mint, when they find solutions.
• Second, a crucial requirement from a PoW-based cryptocurrency is that solutions are broadcast faster than
they are found [8]. This is essential in order to reduce the possibility of disagreement on the leader (i.e.,
forks) - if a miner finds a solution first, but another miner find a different solution before the first solution
was broadcasted, then we cannot know who is the true leader. To overcome this problem (by reducing the
probability of such event), cryptocurrencies try to control the expected rate in which solutions are found.
Recall that the difficulty determines the probability of a single hash to solve the puzzle, and since the
probability of every hash is independent form the other hashes, if the total mining power is known, then
difficulty can be set to determine the expected rate of solutions.
• The third challenge is how to estimate the total mining power. Recall that in public cryptocurrencies, miners
can leave and join the system whenever they want, so there must be a dynamic mechanism to track these
changes and adjust the difficulty accordingly. In most of the PoW-based cryptocurrencies it is done in the
following way. The execution is divided into epochs, where each epoch consists of a fixed number B of
blocks (puzzle solutions), e.g.,B = 2016 in Bitcoin. When epoch epi is over, the system uses the real time
it took for epoch epi to complete in order to estimate the total mining power used during this epoch. Then,
this estimation is used to calculate the new difficulty for the next epoch.
Note that since the difficulty and the reward (number of new minted coins) for finding a solution is always known,
a miner can calculate the expected revenue it gets for every hash it performs, and by taking into account its costs,
the miner can estimate the expected profit per hash. The desired equilibrium in PoW-based cryptocurrencies, which
is important in order to reason about security, is that all miners always (during all epochs) mine with their total
mining power. In this paper we consider the standard demand and supply economic assumption in the desired
equilibrium, by which the profit of the miners are negligible, and show that miners have strictly better strategies
that compromise the coin security. It is important to note that the better strategies we demonstrate in this paper
exists also for an arbitrary  profit, with only minor changes in the numerical results.
3 Model and Definitions
For simplicity of analysis, we define a deterministic model that captures the core of PoW-based cryptocurrencies.
Our model does not use puzzles and a difficulty to determine the probability of a single hash to solve the puzzle.
Instead, we deterministically define the revenue each miner gets from a single hash operation and how many hashes
needed in total to complete an epoch. Note that by defining a deterministic model we give the system more control
and thus our results apply for the real probabilistic case as well. Our model consists of a single coin C and a set
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of miners Π = {p1, . . . , pn}, which mine for C by performing hash operations. Each miner pi possesses a hashing
power that enables it to performmi hashes per time unit, and we allow miners to choose when to hash. We denote
byM ,
∑n
1 mi the total hash power all miners collectively posses. We assume that miners have fixed and variable
costs, that is, a miner pi pays a fixed price FCi every time unit regardless of how many hashes it performs, and
an additional variable price V Ci per every hash.
Recall that a PoW-based cryptocurrency progress in epochs, where each epoch consists of a fix number B
of blocks, and the system sets the difficulty in order to control the expected time T of the epoch. This is done by
choosing the difficulty of the puzzles in a way that requires T ·M total hash operations in expectation in order to
solveB puzzles. In our model we straighten the coin by allowing to define the required number of hash operations
in every epoch deterministically. An execution in our model progresses in sequential epochs ep1, ep2, . . ., where
each epoch epk consists ofHk hashes performed by all miners. That is, epoch epk, k > 1, starts immediately after
Hk−1 hashes were collectively performed during epoch epk−1. We denote by tk the number of time units it took
for epoch epk to complete. Initially,H1 = Mτ , where τ is a system parameter. Intuitively, τ is the desired duration
of time the coin wants every epoch to be. Note that if all miners mine during the first epoch, then the epoch duration
is exactly τ time units, i.e., t1 = τ . As for the next epochs, for every k > 1,Hk =
Hk−1
tk−1 τ . Similar to a real system,
Hk−1
tk−1 estimates the total mining power used during epoch k− 1, andHk is calculated so that if the mining power
stays the same during epoch k, its duration will be the desired τ .
In a real system, a miner can estimate, by the difficulty, its expected revenue and profit from every hash it
performs. Here we define it deterministically. Recall that in a real system a miner gets to mint a fixed number
of coins for every solution, and thus the system “pays” a fixed total of rewards in every epoch. Here, since we
deterministically define the number of hash operations in every epoch, we can deterministically define the revenue
a miner gets for every performed hash. Let w be the total reward the coin C divide during an epoch. (Again, for
example, Bitcoin [15] pays 12.5 Bitcoins per solution, so for an epoch of 2016 blocks, Bitcoin [15] pays 25200
Bitcoins.) For every k ≥ 1, the revenue per hash in epoch epk isRpHk , wHk for every miner.
The miners in our model are rational in a way that they try to maximize their profit over time. Therefore,
they may choose not to utilize there full mining capabilities at all times. However, for simplicity, we assume
that miners do not change their power during an epoch. We denote by mˆi[k] ≤ mi the number of hash opera-
tions per time unit miner pi performs during epoch epk, and the cost per-time-unit of miner pi at epoch epk by
Ci[k] , FCi+V Cimˆi[k]. The revenue per time unit of miner pi during epoch epk is denoted byRi[k] , wHi mˆi[k],
and the profit per-time-unit by Pi[k] , Ri[k]−Ci[k]. The utility function of a miner pi is defined as the average
profit per unit of time over an unbounded execution:
ui , lim
K→∞
ΣKk=1Pi[k] · tk
ΣKk=1tk
We assume that miners are economical beings that would not mine for a loss, but would join mining if it is
profitable. Thus, by the classical model of supply and demand [20, 17], we assume that the profit of miners in
the desired equilibrium, in which miners mine with there full capacity, is some  ≥ 0. Figure 2 uses the “desired
equilibrium” to demonstrate our definitions. To capture this in our model we set w = τΣni=1(FCi + V Cimi + ).
For simplicity and readability we set  = 03. Intuitively, w, the total reward the coin divides during an epoch, is
set to be equal to the total cost the miners pay if they mine in full capacity during the epoch.
4 Rational Mining
Recall that the “desired equilibrium” in a PoW-based cryptocurrencymining system, is such that all minersminewith
full capacity in all epochs. However, due to the difficulty update mechanism this “desired equilibrium” is actually
3In classical economic theories of free markets [20, 17], the revenue and costs strive for equality, resulting in a negligible . This is
not fundamental for the smart mining strategy, and only slightly alters the numerical results.
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Figure 2: Demonstration of the definitions over the “desired equilibrium” strategy. The epoch parameter k is omitted.
not an equilibrium in many cases, and a miner pi has a strongly dominant strategy diverting from the protocol.
In principle, pi can increase the revenues in the next epoch by mining less in the current epoch. This results
in pi losing revenues in the current epoch but also in pi reducing its costs. Therefore, opening a possibility for
increased profits. We call the consequent mining strategy smart mining.
4.1 Smart Mining
Assume that all miners are mining and the system has achieved its “desired equilibrium” and remains stable during
all epochs k‘ < k. Hence, according to the protocol design (and intention), for every k′ < k the values of tk‘,Hk′
and RPHk‘ are fixed to τ,Mτ and wMτ respectively. We now show a strategy by which a miner pi can benefit by
diverting from the protocol. The strategy is for pi to stay idle (not mine) during epochs {epk, epk+2, epk+4, ...}
and to mine with full power during epochs {epk+1, epk+3, epk+5, ...}. Lets analyze pi’s profits.
Epoch k. Since tk−1 = τ , we have in epk thatHk = Mτ as well. If pi remains idle during epk, then
tk =
Hk
M −mi =
τ
1− miM
.
Consequently, pi’s profit for epk is (−FCi · tk), which is negative if there are any fixed costs.
Epoch k+ 1. Since tk = τ1−mi
M
> τ , the difficulty adjustment mechanism reduces the difficulty which in turn
increases the reward per hash and correspondingly also the profit per time unit. The resulting values are:
Hk+1 =
τ
tk
·Hk = M −mi
M
·Mτ
RPHk+1 =
w
Hk+1
=
w
(M −mi)τ
tk+1 =
Hk+1
M
=
M −mi
M
· τ
Pi[k+ 1] = miRPHk+1 − (VCimi + FCi) = miw
(M −mi)τ − (VCimi + FCi)
Epochs≥ k+2. Since tk+1 = M−miM ·τ andHk+1 = M−miM ·Mτ , we have in epk+2 thatHk+2 = Mτ as in epk.
The rest is identical to epk. Inductively, from here on epochs {epk+2, epk+4, ...} result in the same values as in epk,
and epochs {epk+3, epk+5, ...} result in the same values as in epk+1. Figure 3 illustrates the smart mining strategy.
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Figure 3: Smart mining strategy for a party pi. Profitable when Pi[k+ 1] · tk+1 > Pi[k] · tk.
We are now ready to calculate i’s profit averaged over time as defined by the utility function.
ui , lim
K→∞
ΣKk′=1Pi[k
′] · tk′
ΣKk′=1tk′
= lim
K→∞
[
ΣKk′=1(Pi[2k
′ − 1] · t2k′−1) + ΣKk′=1(Pi[2k′] · t2k′)
ΣKk′=1tk′
]
=
Pi[k+ 1] · tk+1 + Pi[k] · tk
tk+1 + tk
=
(
miw
(M−mi)τ − (VCimi + FCi)
)
tk+1 − FCitk
tk+1 + tk
=
(
miw
(M−mi)τ − (VCimi + FCi)
)
M−mi
M − MM−miFCi
M−mi
M +
M
M−mi
=
miw
Mτ − (VCimi + FCi) M−miM − MM−miFCi
M−mi
M +
M
M−mi
In the “desired equilibrium” of the protocol ui = . Therefore, the smart mining strategy strictly dominates
the protocol whenever ui > . Moreover, recall that (1) the revenue per hash given by the coin in the stable
state is wMτ , (2) miner’s pi revenue per unit time is
w
Mτmi, and (3) her costs are VCimi + FCi. Since honest
miners don’t mine for a loss, under our demand and supply assumption [20, 17], the market powers establish
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w
Mτmi = (VCimi + FCi) + . Assuming for simplicity → 0, we calculate below when ui > 0.
ui > 0
⇐⇒
w
Mτ
mi >
M −mi
M
(VCimi + FCi) +
M
M −miFCi
⇐⇒
VCimi + FCi >
M −mi
M
(VCimi + FCi) +
M
M −miFCi
⇐⇒
mi
M
>
FCi
VCimi + FCi
· M
M −mi
⇐⇒
mi
M
· M −mi
M
>
FCi
VCimi + FCi
Denoting the percentage of the fixed cost out of the total costs as y , FCiVCi·mi+FCi , and the percentage of i’s min-
ing power as x , miM , we get that our smart mining attack strictly dominates the protocol whenever x · (1−x) > y
for (x, y) ∈ (0,1)× (0,1). Figure 4 illustrates in which costs structure the smart mining attack dominates honest
mining. As an example, when the fixed costs are 10% of the total costs, having 12% of the mining power suffices
to create excess profit using smart mining.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
mining power
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
%FC
Figure 4: smart mining strictly dominate honest mining in the area under the curve. x-axis: miM , y-
axis: FCiVCi·mi+FCi .
4.2 Smarter Mining
Having the basic smart mining explained we can now improve it by fine tuning. When we expand the miner’s
strategy space to include strategies where 0 ≤ mˆi[k] ≤mi (that is, not an all or nothing but a combined strategy),
the miner can achieve even greater profits by deviating from honest mining. Moreover, attacking profits the miner
in many more scenarios, both with higher fixed costs percentages and with less mining power required. For these
reasons we denote the fine-tuned attack as smarter mining. Smarter mining stems from the observation that all
mining operations profit in the high revenue epochs regardless of their participation in the attack, and only the idle
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mining power bares a loss in the low revenue epochs. In particular, an honest miner profits from the attack without
incurring any costs. Thus, a smarter attacking miner might choose to optimize her profits by slightly reducing her
excess profits in an HRE in exchange for a higher reduction of her LRE losses. A miner that optimizes her mˆi[k]
in a smarter way than mˆi[k] ∈ {0,mi}may therefore enjoy higher average profits. An illustration of the intuition
behind smarter mining appears in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Smarter mining strategy for a party pi. By mining with part of its mining power (0 < mˆi < mi) during
low revenue epochs, pi is able to maximize its profit by optimizing the balance between losing in low revenue
epochs and gaining in high revenue epochs.
Expected Profit Analysis. The analysis is similar to Section 4.1 only that in epochs {epk, epk+2, ...}, miner pi
mines with mˆi[k] mining power and in epochs {epk+1, epk+3, ...}, it mines with its full powermi. Denote ∆mi ,
mi−mˆi[k], that is, the amount of pi’s idle mining power during epochs {epk, epk+2, ...}, and we have the following:
Epoch k.
tk−1 = τ
Hk = Mτ
tk =
Hk
M −∆mi =
τ
1− ∆miM
RPHk =
w
Hk
=
w
M · τ =
1
mi
(VCimi + FCi)
Pi[k] = RPHkmˆi[k]− (VCimˆi[k] + FCi) =
(
mˆi[k]
mi
− 1
)
FCi
Epoch k + 1. Since tk = τ
1−∆mi
M
, the difficulty adjustment mechanism reduces the difficulty which in turn
increases the reward per hash and correspondingly also the profit per time unit. The resulting values are:
Hk+1 =
τ
tk
Hk = (M −∆mi)τ
tk+1 =
Hk+1
M
=
M −∆mi
M
τ
RPHk+1 =
w
Hk+1
=
w
(M −∆mi)τ =
M
M −∆miRPHk =
1
mi
· M
M −∆mi (VCimi + FCi)
Pi[k+ 1] = miRPHk+1 − (VCimi + FCi) = ∆mi
M −∆mi (VCimi + FCi)
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Epochs≥ k+ 2. Since tk+1 = M−∆miM τ andHk+1 = (M −∆mi)τ , we have in epk+2 thatHk+2 = Mτ as
in epk. The rest is identical to epk. Inductively, from here on epochs {epk+2, epk+4, ...} result in the same values
as in epk, and epochs {epk+3, epk+5, ...} result in the same values as in epk+1.
As a result, if pi employs the smarter mining strategy, her profit averaged over time as defined by the utility
function would be:
ui , lim
K→∞
ΣKk′=1Pi[k
′] · tk′
ΣKk′=1tk′
= lim
K→∞
[
ΣKk′=1(Pi[2k
′ − 1] · t2k′−1) + ΣKk′=1(Pi[2k′] · t2k′)
ΣKk′=1tk′
]
=
Pi[k+ 1] · tk+1 + Pi[k] · tk
tk+1 + tk
=
Pi[k+1]︷ ︸︸ ︷
∆mi
M −∆mi (VCimi + FCi) ·
tk+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
M −∆mi
M
τ +
Pi[k]︷ ︸︸ ︷(
mˆi[k]
mi
− 1
)
FCi ·
tk︷ ︸︸ ︷
τ
1− ∆miM
M−∆mi
M · τ + τ1−∆mi
M
=
∆mi
M (VCimi + FCi)− ∆mimi · MM−∆miFCi
M−∆mi
M +
M
M−∆mi
Figure 6 shows the strong potential of the proposed strategy. The colors represent profits as the percentage
of the total cost ( uiVCimi+FCi − 1), x axis the mining power (
mi
M ), and y axis the costs structure (
FCi
VCimi+FCi ).
Unlike selfish mining [10, 18], we can see that there are many scenarios in which smarter mining is profitable
already for a very small miner. Furthermore, the expected profits yield a reasonable return on investment that makes
smarter mining a viable economic strategy.
5 Coin Security and Other Parties Best Response
As we have shown in Section 4, the desired equilibrium of the coin, in which the participants invest all of their
power to secure the coin (mining with full capacity), is actually not an equilibrium in many cases. In an abundant
of realistic scenarios, a miner pi has a strongly dominating strategy over honest mining. One might hope, however,
that the response of the other participants in the system may somehow balance the negative effect of pi deviating
from the protocol. Unfortunately, this does not happen with smart/smarter mining. Unlike other strategies (e.g.
selfish mining [10, 18]), in our strategy pi’s deviation from the protocol does not harm the rest of the miners, on
the contrary, it benefits them.
Prior to the attack, a miner pj 6= pi that acts honestly receives the incomemjRpHk per unit time. After pi starts
the attack, pj receives the income per unit timemjRpHk (which she is satisfied with) in the low revenue epochs,
and she receivesmjRpHk+1 > mjRpHk in the high revenue epochs. Thereby, pj’s utility (uj) is increased due
to pi’s attack. Thus, even if pj is rational and considers deviating from honest mining, she has no incentive to
obstruct pi’s attack. In fact, it can be shown in similar way to or analysis that not only that pj will not resist pi’s
attack in any way, the only possible strategy deviating from honest mining that might be more profitable in specific
cases for pj is to join the attack and increase both of their profits.
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0
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0.20
Figure 6: smarter mining Return On Investment. For every , if%Profit> V Cimi+FCi , than smarter mining
strictly dominates honest mining.
Coin security. Obviously, since less mining power is invested during low revenue epochs in smart/smarter mining,
these strategies expose the coin to under 50% attacks. For example, the smart mining strategy is profitable for
a miner that controls 20% of the total mining power with fixed costs that constitutes up to 15% of its total costs.
Therefore, if such miner chooses to adopt the smart mining strategy, a bad miner will be able to attack the coin
with only 41% of the total mining power. This vulnerability grows even more when we consider the other miners.
As mentioned above, in some cases it is profitable for other miners to join the smart/smarter mining strategies, and
leave the low revenue epochs with even less honest mining power.
Surprisingly, the joining of new miners to the coin only makes the security problem worse in smart/smarter
mining strategies. For comparison, in long term analysis of selfish mining [10], we get that new miners benefit
from joining the coin due to the drop in difficulty, which leads to higher RpH. These new miners mitigate the
loss in honest mining power due to forks created by selfish mining. However, this is not the case in smart/smarter
mining. Obviously joining miners will join the epoch that are profitable for them, which are the high revenue
epochs (smart/smarter mining does not change the RpH in low level epochs, so if these epochs were not profitable
for new miners before, they remain unprofitable after the smart/smarter mining attack is performed). This, in turn,
will lead to a drop in the RpH in the low revenue epochs due the difficulty adjustment, and force more miners to
abandon these epochs, leaving them with even less honest mining power.
6 Discussion
The recent drop in the Bitcoin [15] price makes mining much less profitable than in the past, and force miners to
revisit their mining strategies. In this paper we propose two strategies, smart and smarter mining, that, in many
cases, strictly dominate honest mining. In contrast to other known attacks that induce zero-sum games among
miners [10], the strategies proposed in this paper increase miners’ profits by reducing their variable costs (i.e.,
electricity). However, while saving electricity power is very encouraging for the environment, it is less so for the
coin security. The smart/smarter mining strategies expose the coin to under 50% attacks during low revenue epochs,
and this vulnerability only grows when new miners join the coin as a response to the increase in profit margins
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induced by these strategies.
Interestingly, the smart/smarter mining can be profitable even for miners that poses a relatively small amount
of mining power, and in case the fixed cost is negligible even less than 1% is enough. Another point that is worth
to mention is the potential of smart/smarter mining in a system with many PoW-based coins. Although this paper
deals with a single coin system, the extension into multiple coins only strengthen the attack strategies, since it
allows attackers to mine for other coins during low revenue epochs and thus significantly reduce the loss in these
epochs or even make profit by joining other coins in their high revenue epochs.4
In this work we have exploited the difficulty adjustment mechanisms of PoW-based cryptocurrencies by manipu-
lating it to our benefit. In general, this is but a single case of trying to emulate a continues process (supply and demand
adjustment) by a discrete process (difficulty update in epochs). Similar issues are likely to arise in other mechanisms
and systems, as the transformation from continues to discrete is not trivial, but does not always receive the appropriate
attention during the design of a system. We believe that areas such as blockchains, where real world systems progress
faster than rigorous analysis, provide many opportunities for theoretical research to make meaningful contributions.
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